Thursday, December 14, 2006

Israel & Syria: Incentives For Peace

Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights is the main sticking point between Syria and Israel, but it is also their key to reconciliation.

This is a good article taken from (the comment is free section) The Guardian, 14.12.06
By Faisal al Yafai

Driving south-west from Damascus towards the border with Israel, wind-turbines gradually slip into view. Perched on top of the Golan Heights, they rotate slowly, a flash of technology amid the grass and hills. "Look at that," gestures a Syrian friend I am driving with, "You could give us the Golan for another 30 years and we wouldn't put up more turbines." This may be unfair - Israel is a much smaller country than Syria and receives far more foreign aid - but the point remains: the Israelis have looked after the Golan Heights.

Unfortunately, they belong to Syria. Today is the 25th anniversary of the Golan Heights Law, when the Israeli government extended the laws of Israel to the Heights, denounced by many as illegally annexing it. The Heights are a wide plateau between Syria and Israel, immensely strategically important because they allow whoever controls them to look down into their neighbour's country, and because the largest freshwater lake in Israel, Lake Galilee (the historical Sea of Galilee) is fed from the Heights. During the 1967 war, the Israelis captured the Heights from Syria, were driven out in 1973 and then took it back again. Israel's annexation is illegal under international law, and is unrecognised even by the United States.

Still, it's proving a thorny issue to resolve and is the main sticking point between Syria and Israel. Indeed, it is the key to peace between the two countries - Syria's president, Bashar al-Assad, has repeatedly offered peace with Israel if the Golan is returned. It may even be one of the keys to peace in Iraq, since Assad would want international pressure over the Golan as a price for his involvement in Iraq. Even the Iraq Study Group's report concluded the Golan ought to be returned.

It's a question of people and one of politics. The number of settlers illegally living in the Golan has increased in recent years, aided by offers of free land for Israelis who move there. The Washington Post reported a few weeks ago that the number of Jewish settlers may have surpassed the number of Arabs living there.

Moreover, current Israeli PM Ehud Olmert has said the Golan "will remain in our hands forever", and ruled out talks with Damascus. That has drawn criticism from Olmert's own countrymen, urging him not to throw away a chance for peace. "[This is] a full-scale abandonment of the country's welfare," wrote an Israeli commentator. "The Olmert government has an offer from Damascus? It should respect it and look into it."

On the surface, there are few reasons to be cheerful for the 20,000 living under occupation, but Syria is rather optimistic. Apart from the increasing realisation in Washington and London that Syria needs to be involved in Iraq, the failure of the Israelis to defeat Hizbullah in the summer has only emboldened Damascus - hence its recent sabre rattling. That has led to a feeling that Syria need only extend the hand of peace to Israel and wait. But it is not so simple.

Although there has not been a shot fired across the Golan in 30 years, the Israelis have legitimate security concerns over returning the occupied land. With Syria still supporting a Hamas-led Palestinian government that maintains a forceful stance against Israel, there is a real question of trust. No Israeli government wants to hand back the Golan, only for the Syrians to launch attacks from there.

Nor should the psychological draw of the Golan among the Israeli street be underestimated. For Israelis, the Golan represents something of a comfort zone. It is the only part of Israel that has a ski resort and Israelis often hike its trails. Unable to accomplish peace with their neighbours and feeling their country's position is misunderstood abroad, the Golan is something of a breathing space for a populace that often feels itself under siege.

Syria needs to allay those security fears, perhaps by accepting some degree of time-limited monitoring by an international force in the region. The second will be harder: after so many years of tension, and propaganda on both sides, it won't be easy to convince ordinary Israelis that they will be welcome in a reunited Golan.

The Israelis too need to do something to convince ordinary Syrians. During the 1973 war, the Israelis retreated from a city called Quneitra, the main city of the Golan Heights. Before they left, they systemically destroyed the entire place, blowing up every building and stripping off every piece of furniture that could be removed and sold. The Syrians, somewhat petulantly, refused to rebuild it, instead keeping it as an open-air museum. And it's all still there - the enormous Orthodox church, broken and bare; the mosque with its destroyed minaret, and street upon street of shattered homes. That has a powerful psychological impact on the some 20,000 Syrians still living in the Golan, who must wonder what will happen to them.

Moreover, the UN has reported (Section 5, 70-82) widespread discrimination and suffering among the Arabs in the Golan Heights. Arbitrary arrest, general harassment, a lack of job opportunities and separation from families top the list, all while more and more settlers stream in. While their position is not nearly as difficult as the Palestinians, some moves towards easing the pressures on them would be noticed in Damascus and the wider Arab world, helping Israel's image.

So there are difficulties on both sides, but incentives too. Damascus feels in a strong position at the moment but Assad must realise that may not last for long. The Syrians know that there are demands on them as well from the Baker report, in particular to stop interfering in Lebanon, stop supporting Hizbullah and Hamas, and co-operate fully with the UN investigation into Hariri's death. Damascus has largely fulfilled the last of those, but is unlikely to give up its support for Hamas or Hizbullah without movement on the Golan. That leaves Lebanon, from which Assad would be wise to refrain - and be seen to refrain - in order to bolster his credibility outside the Arab world.

Tel Aviv - with the summer war still fresh in the memory - feels especially reluctant to move.

Israelis must wonder why they should give up land to a country that supports Hamas and is close to Iran. But in fact, that is the seed of the answer: the Golan issue is holding Israel back from peace with Syria, and pushing its neighbour towards the belligerent rule of President Ahmadinejad. Far better to negotiate now when Damascus feels strong (and might be willing to compromise) than later, when Damascus might be closer to an even stronger Iran. Not negotiating would mean comprising the country's security. Peace with Syria would not only drive a wedge between Syria and Iran, but also deprive Damascus of some justification for supporting Hizbullah, as well as a reason for maintaining its decades-old emergency laws. That would be a worthwhile trade for the Israelis, and indeed for the Syrians.

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